A critical assessment of gender revolution theory

In this short note, I aim to critically examine the gender revolution theory (GRT, hereafter), both from theoretical and empirical perspective. This note is particularly focused on Goldscheider et al. (2015). This theory has been paid a considerable attention in demography in recent years. The theory originates from a response to recent reversal trends of fertility in rich countries, and focuses on structural change in gender relationship in public and private spheres. There are some weak points, as I argue below, in this theory: its theoretical inclination towards development idealism and limited empirical supports. This note consists of four sections. First, I introduce a general overview of this theory: what does the theory try to explain and what is a unique feature in this theory compared with other fertility transition theory? Second, I examine the GRT from a theoretical perspective, while the third section deals with a couple of empirical expectations derived from the theory. Lastly, I will discuss a potential implication of this theory and conclude the note.

Gender revolution theory: what is unique?

The theory is based on a theoretical response to a rise in the total fertility rate (TFR) in rich countries. In some Northern European countries, the TFR has risen in recent years. In particular Sweden has seen a dramatic reversal trend in the TFR from late 1990s to late 2000s as the figure below shows. A dominant theory to explain sub-replacement fertility trends is the Second Demographic Transition (SDT), which emphasizes a transition from material to post-material value (self-realization and autonomy) as a consequence of societal development. Under the SDT framework, individuals with ‘untraditional’ norms and individualistic values will pursue higher order needs and choose multiple forms of living arrangement (Lesthaeghe 2010). During the SDT, fertility and nuptiality are increasingly less connected, and thus there has been an increase in cohabitation, non-marital childbearing, and divorce.

An theoretical expectation derived from the SDT is a continuous decrease in the TFR. In contrast to the expectation, however, some rich countries have seen a reversal trend in the TFR. These countries are typically geographically located in Northern Europe, and demograhers started to explore a possible mechanism to explain the reversal trend, which is the GRT.

One uniqueness of the GRT is its focus on changing structure of gender relationship. According to Goldscheider et al. (2015), the gender revolution has two phases. In the first phase when women's participation in labor market started to rise, there was a delay in marriage, a decrease in probability of marriage, delay in childbearing, and an increase in divorce. In the second phase, however, the relationship between women's labor participation and these demographic behaviors has gradually weakened or even reversal. In the current European countries, Sweden in particular, the TFR is also high in countries where women's labor participation is high. This structural change in gender relationship both in the public and private sectors, which is referred to as a gender revolution in Goldscheider et al. (2015), is an important aspect to explain this reversal trend in fertility. According to Goldscheider et al. (2015), there has been an increase in men’s involvement with housework and child care, which contributed to stabilizing families and increasing fertility.

Also, unlike other fertility transition theories, the GRT focuses not only on fertility but also other family dimensions (union formation and dissolution). While giving a credit to McDonald (2000)’s gender equity theory, which explains a variation in the TFR in affluent countries from policy perspective, Goldscheider et al. (2015) argues that these family formation behaviors are less influenced by the policy, but largely influenced by changing gender relationship.

Moreover, the GRT has an orientation for comparative perspective. As Goldscheider et al. (2015) examined, the theory compares the association between gender inequality and fertility both in Western and non-Western countries, while the primary focus of the second demographic transition theory was on Western countries, and it later started to examine whether the theoretical expectation fits with other countries (Lesthaeghe 2010). This initially formulated comparative perspective has a theoretical advantage. On the one hand, the SDT theory started from sub-replacement fertility countries in Europe, and found that it is correlated with a rise in non-material value. Thus their analytical approach examines whether the findings in European countries is generalizable to other contexts, which may dismiss a potential important institutional characteristics in the non-Western countries. As England insightfully suggested, the post-materialist culture might be rooted in the liberal individualism which is dominant in most of Western societies (England 2010). On the other hand, the GRT focuses on gender inequality, which is an obviously common characteristics to many rich countries, and it thus successfully includes both Western and non-Western countries into their analysis.

Figure: Fertility trends in selected countries 1960-2016 (source: the world bank)

Theoretical assumption of gender revolution theory and its critique

Although the GRT has many advantages to explain the reversal trends in low fertility, the same critiques for the past fertility transition theory are applicable. First, the theory assumes fertility trends are associated with social development because it implicitly argues industrial countries converge into gender-egalitarian regimes (specifically, Sweden). This assumption is quite comparable to what Thornton (2001) calls ‘development idealism’, which is characterized by its propositions that modern families are good and modern individuals are labeled as free and equal. A possible critique towards the GRT is not to argue that changing gender relationship should not be considered as good or bad, but to argue that it should be cautious to link gender equality to a reversal trend in fertility with an assumption that every gender-inegalitarian countries will converge to what contemporary Sweden has seen.

The theory also mentions ‘strength’ of families. For instance, Goldscheider et al. (2015: 208) argues the gender revolution “is actually strengthening families”. By this they meant that equal relationship between men and women makes families more stable and cohesive. This assumption seems to propose that families are measured by strong or weak, and also there are some families that are weak. The theory is focused on the gender inequality between men and women at private spheres, which implicitly ignores other types of families, such as single parent families or same-sex couples. Although the GRT did not explicitly mention, it should be the case that the theory solely limit their focus to two-parent families.

Empirical assessment of the theory

As this note mentioned, the GRT emphasizes the role of structural shift towards gender egalitarian regimes, but most of the changes are attributable to individual behaviors (women's labor force participation, better access to higher education, and men's increasing involvement with private spheres). In that sense, as Riley (1999) argued, the GRT might ignore socio-institutional basis of gender. Comparing a sum of individual behaviors across countries with different institutional contexts may inhibit a clear empirical analysis. For example, it is skeptical that the Goldscheider's emphasis on women's labor force participation as a key indicator to understand the relationship between fertility change. Women's labor force participation in Japan outpaces that of US in 2014. If Goldscheider's prediction is right, the US should increase the women's labor force participation, but the rate has not shown an upward trend. Obviously, gender inequality in Japan is more serious than in the US in many respects (persistent gender wage gap, father's lower rate of taking parental leave, and men's lower contribution to housework).

Also, a sole focus on quantitatively collected information ignores contextual features that might be distal for low fertility. Although Goldscheider et al. (2015: 222) argued “there is growing evidence that men’s increasing involvement in homemaking and childcare may potentially increase fertility. Such evidence has been found in countries with ultra-low fertility”, this is still one side of the coin. Studies have found mixed supports for the relationship between father’s involvement and a transition to fertility. Fathers’ contribution to childcare has a positive  effect (but depends on mother's employment status) on the likelihood of a second birth in Spain, but not for Italy (Cooke 2009). Also, women’s fertility intentions are influenced by unequal division of household work only for those who have long work hours and children (Mills et al. 2008).

Mixed supports for the relationship may stem from different institutional contexts in those low and ultra-low fertility countries. Brinton et al. (2018), for instance, examines the gap in desired and actual fertility in four rich countries - Sweden, US, Spain, and Japan -, and focuses on the role of gender inequality, as Goldscheider et al. (2015) did. Although sharing research interests, unlike comparing quantitative measures in different countries, their approach to ask this question was to use qualitative interview. Their analysis reveals that the influence of gender inequality on fertility intention differs by institutional contexts. In Japan, most women implicitly accept unequal division of labor as given and did not reason the lack of husband’s housework share constraints their intention. This finding is supported by their analysis of male interviewees among full-time couples, showing that they are likely to have gender egalitarian attitudes but their long work hours prohibits husband’s contribution to housework (Brinton et al. 2018: 299). In contrast to the Japanese case, in Spain, couples emphasized high levels of economic uncertainty as a condition to maintain both partners work fulltime. In these lowest-low fertility countries, the role of gender inequality is not performed to the extent that GRT expected. Rather, institutional contexts, possibly combined with gender inequality, creates their perception towards gaps in desired and actual fertility.

Although Goldscheider et al. (2015) slightly discussed growing class inequality, another skeptic view stems from the fact that family trends are not converging even within a single country. Sociologists understand that family formation is increasingly stable among highly-educated couples, and that the opposite is the case among the less educated - `diverging destinies', as coined by McLanahan (2004). The GRT does not clearly reconcile the gap in the sociological literature on family adaptation to demographic change. This is understandable given that the GRT originates from Swedish experience where income inequality is not high under the strong welfare regime.

Conclusion
Demographers have tried to theorize trends in fertility in the world. While the SDT explains why the TFR reached the below replacement fertility, it fails to explain a recent reversal trend in fertility in some rich countries. The GRT has emerged as an alternative theory to explain the reversal trends. In that sense, the most fundamental contribution of the theory to demographic transition is its application of the gender equity theory (McDonald 2000) to explaining trends in fertility. That being said, it should be criticized both from theoretical and empirical perspectives. In particular, its extensive focus on the Swedish case is a double edge sword. On the one hand, by largely relying on the forerunner of the demographic transition, it successfully provides a strong argument to predict a future fertility change in other rich countries. On the other hand, its assumption that ‘developed’ countries will converge into the Swedish case in terms of its gender equality and fertility is to be considered a bit too much optimistic and may fall in the development idealism. While the thesis provided by the theory is clear and easy to test, demographers also need to be cautious about its assumption behind the theory and potential limitations.

Reference
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