Revisiting Diverging Destinies

In recent years, both sociologists and economists have paid much attention to a divergence in family behaviors. Sociologist Sara McLanahan is the first person who proposed so called diverging destinies hypothesis at her presidential address at Population Association of America (McLanahan 2004). In this address, she argued that there has been an increase in non-traditional family behaviors (delayed marriage, cohabitation, non-marital childbearing, and divorce) in the Untied States, and this pattern accompanies a growing divide between high and low SES groups. Specifically, highly educated women, who had actually a higher probability of divorce and delayed marriage in the past, are (1) more likely to experience marrying someone, (2) less likely to have children out of wedlock, and (3) less likely to be divorced than lower educated women. McLanahan further argued that these growing divides in family behaviors across SES groups have a significant implication for children. This is what she called diverging “destinies,” meaning that single parenthood, non-marital childbearing, and divorce, all of which are now concentrated among lower educated groups, are negatively associated with children’s socio-economic outcomes.

Economists also echo her thesis. In particular, Lundberg et al. (2016) also discussed a diverging family patterns in the United States. This paper paid a particular attention to the rise in cohabitation as a main cause of the retreat from marriage over the years. To explain the rise in cohabitation, Lundberg et al. (2016) provides an economic explanation focusing on a role of marriage for investing in their children and how changes in economic incentives of investment in children explain the divergent patterns in family behaviors.
Given its potential implication and wide coverage of scope, it is not surprising that this thesis has been cited often, both positively and negatively, in demographic science. One of major critiques provided by other scholars is its limited contextual focus. Although her address and later updates (McLanahan and Jacobsen 2014) discussed cases from other countries, the thesis is mainly focused on the United States. Importantly, limited focus is not on countries but contexts. McLanahan extends her thesis to rich European countries, which also have seen the rise in cohabitation, non-marital childbearing, and divorce. Although her update (McLanahan and Jacobsen 2014) looked at a non-Western country, Japan, it only examined growing educational divide in the likelihood of divorce (Raymo et al. 2004). As I discuss below, countries with other contexts, including Japan, did not necessarily see the rise in cohabitation.

Although this hypothesis covers a wide range of non-traditional family behaviors, its generalizability seems to be limited. This makes a somewhat interesting contrast with the Second Demographic Transition, which posits that ideational changes lead to a new stage of demographic transition in rich countries broadly. In order to increase a theoretical leverage of this hypothesis, this short essay proposes that we should focus on smaller number of explananda (things to be explained). To provide this redefinition of the thesis, I first examine proposed causes and whether these causes are applicable to other contexts. Based on this examination, I then propose that a redefinition of the thesis is needed for much broader theoretical implication.

Causes of diverging patterns in family behaviors and its generalizability 
McLanahan argued that there are four causes that drive the diverging patterns in family behaviors: the rise in feminism, changing birth control, changing labor market prospects for women and men, and changing welfare policy for single mothers (McLanahan 2004: 617-619). These proposed causes suggest that one fundamental pathway through which family formation have changed, that is, declining economic incentive of marriage. Women’s improved access to education and labor market and welfare programs to support single mothers decreased economic incentive for women to marry. A decline in “marriageable” men caused by a deterioration of low-skilled workers also contributes to this pattern.

Lundberg et al. (2016) adds another insight to the causes of divergence, which focuses on marriage as a commitment device. This point is based on an economic model of family formation in which individuals are expected to calculate gains from marriage. As non-traditional family behaviors such as cohabitation have been more accepted, actors may choose to marry or not based on their cost-benefit calculation. Lundberg et al. (2016) argued that since an exit cost (dissolution) is higher for marriage than for cohabitation, marriage could function as a devise which makes a commitment more feasible. A specific example of commitment they raised is children’s education. Since there has been diverging patterns in returns to education in the United States, investing in children’s education is increasingly a more compelling reason for highly educated couples to get married rather than staying unmarried.

This seems to be similar to the declining economic incentive of marriage, but this scenario is distinct from the declining incentive thesis because it argues that economic incentive to marry has actually increased especially for highly educated groups. Indeed, Lundberg et al. (2016: 90) argued that while declining economic incentive to marry is a “proximate cause of the retreat from marriage,” its underlying forces are applicable to all education groups. In addition to that, if we focus on consumption aspect as a source of marriage (Becker 1973), an increase in return to the consumption (i.e., “raising economically successful children”) among highly educated group offsets the declining demand of marriage (Lundberg et al. 2016: 93-94).

Based on McLanahan (2004) and Lundberg et al. (2016) discussions about causes of diverging patterns in family behaviors, the two mechanisms are proposed to explain why family patterns have diverged. Importantly, these proposed mechanisms are derived from mostly an examination of a single case, that is, the United States. Thus, examining whether these mechanisms are applicable to other contexts is open to empirical test and could elucidate which part of diverging destinies thesis should be observed or not in broader contexts. Given the limited space, the discussion below is focused on one single country which shares the level of economic development but different socio-cultural foundations, that is, Japan.

First, declining incentive of marriage is generally applicable to the Japanese case. Demographers generally agreed that (1) rising women’s education is positively associated with both delayed marriage and less marriage and (2) the declining economic prospects among less educated men contributes to the retreat from marriage (Raymo et al. 2015). In contrast, growing demand for marriage as a commitment devise is not necessarily applicable. If this hypothesis is right, we should expect to see other changes in family formation, that is assortative mating. Indeed, the United State has seen a dramatic increase in educational assortative mating (Schwartz and Mare 2005). However, educational homogamy has declined in Japan (Fujihara and Uchikoshi 2019).

What should be noted here is that these mechanisms could possibly explain why people do marry or not marry, but it does not explain why people increasingly stay in a cohabiting union, because if these hypotheses are correct, people may choose to stay single and do not have children. This is what has occurred in East Asian countries including Japan, where  studies argued the proportion of life-long singlehood has increased markedly among both men and women (National Institute of Population and Social Security Research 2018).

To summarize, some of the mechanisms proposed to explain diverging patterns in family behaviors could be applicable to other contexts, but others not. Importantly, these mechanisms are focused on why there has been an uneven patterns in the retreat from marriage, but it fails to explain why cohabitation has increased among specific groups. If they fail to explain the rise in cohabitation, it also fails to explain the rise in non-marital childbearing, because the increase in out of wedlock childbearing largely occurs in cohabiting unions. Since cohabitation increased but its duration has been short on average, non-marital childbearing has been marginal in East Asian countries (Raymo et al. 2015).

Thus, differentials in the likelihood of marriage (not cohabitation) and divorce remain after rejecting the rise in cohabitation and non-marital childbearing. As I have argued, studies suggest that the demand for marriage as a commitment device has not increased in Japan. Possibly reflecting this trend, results on the relationship between education and marriage are mixed. Some studies reported there is a negative relationship but a couple of studies argued the relationship has changed in recent cohorts (Raymo et al 2015). Therefore, there is only one family pattern which was observed as part of diverging destinies proposed by McLanahan, that is divorce (Raymo et al. 2004). Considering these patterns, scholars in the diverging destinies need to recognize that family patterns have diverged not only within a given population but also between populations.

Possible redefinition of diverging destinies thesis
In this essay, I asked the following question, that is, in which direction the diverging destinies thesis should be heading? Given the diverging patterns in family formation between populations, it is safe to argue that the thesis focuses on smaller number of explananda. Specifically, the thesis should stick with why there is a growing divide in marriage and divorce across SES groups, while admitting other possible choices of family formation (e.g., cohabitation or nonmarital childbearing) depend on socio-cultural contexts. In other words, it is recommended not to attempt to argue that the rise in cohabitation and non-marital childbearing is the diverging family pattern we should see. Rather, scholars focusing on potential implications of the thesis try to find other relevant and similar family patterns, and examine whether there is a growing divide between high and low SES groups.

Also, they have to pay more attention to the role of social norm or ideology. Socio-cultural contexts often appear in individual’s attitudes towards social norms or ideologies, which often functions as a barrier to change rather than cause of change (Ruggles 2015). In this sense, it was somewhat unfortunate that the diverging destinies thesis did not fully discuss the role of social norm but treated changes in social norms as given (Mclanahan 2004: 617; Lundberg et al. 2016: 86). As Goode argued more than 50 years ago, changes in family patterns would be slow without the influence of ideology (Goode 1963: 369). Given the lasting influence of social norm in Asian countries that makes a linkage between fertility and marriage strong, a close examination of ideational factors helps us understand the diverging patterns in family behaviors between populations.

References
Becker, G. S. 1973. “A Theory of Marriage: Part I.” The Journal of Political Economy 81(4):813–46.
Fujihara, S. and F. Uchikoshi. 2019. “Research in Social Stratification and Mobility.” Research in Social Stratification and Mobility 1–12 (in press).
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Lundberg, S., R. A. Pollak, and J. Stearns. 2016. "Family Inequality: Diverging Patterns in Marriage, Cohabitation, and Childbearing." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 30(2), 79-102.
McLanahan, S. 2004. “Diverging Destinies: How Children Are Faring Under the Second Demographic Transition.” Demography 41(4):607–27.
McLanahan, S. and W. Jacobsen. 2014. “Diverging Destinies Revisited.” Pp. 3–23 in Families in an Era of Increasing Inequality, edited by P. R. Amato, A. Booth, S. M. McHale, and J. Van Hook. Springer.
National Institute of Population and Social Security Research. 2018. Latest demographic statistics. Tokyo: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research.
Raymo, J. M., H. Park, Y. Xie, and W.-J. J. Yeung. 2015. “Marriage and Family in East Asia: Continuity and Change.” Annual Review of Sociology 41(1):471–92.
Raymo, J. M., L. Bumpass, and M. Iwasawa. 2004. “Marital Dissolution in Japan.” Demographic Research 11:395–420.
Ruggles, S. 2015. “Patriarchy, Power, and Pay: the Transformation of American Families, 1800–2015.” Demography 52(6):1797–1823.
Schwartz, C. R. and R. D. Mare. 2005. “Trends in Educational Assortative Marriage From 1940 to 2003.” Demography 42(4):621–46.