6年前の記事だが、筒井先生が「計量社会学」について解説された記事がTL上に流れてきたので、私のここ最近の疑問と考えについて書いておく。
わたしたちが生きる社会はどのように生まれたのか
計量社会学者・筒井淳也氏インタビュー
日本よりも先に計量的な手法が発達したアメリカでは「計量社会学」がない。したがって、「計量社会学」に対する英訳もない（quantitative sociologyという言葉は全く聞かないし、quantitative methodsという表現はあるが、それは自分の研究手法を表現するもので、もし研究関心としてこの用語をあげたら、その人はメソドロジーが専門だと思われる）。
では、日本の「計量-」はアメリカでは何に該当するのか。私は社会人口学（social demography）だと思っている。
なぜならば、筒井先生の記事で言及されている、「計量-」が分析対象とする「社会」はほぼ「人口」によって代表されるものだからだ。ここでの人口の訳はpopulationであり、日本語では「母集団」とされるところのものである。
記事で挙げられている社会移動は、究極的には分析単位は個人の社会的地位の変化であり、それを集団レベルにまとめあげて社会における流動性を測定している。都市化による人口移動は、まさに人口学がコアとしてきたmigrationの一つである。核家族化、晩婚・非婚化を研究する社会学者の多くが家族人口学の研究者でもある。家族人口学とは、家族的な現象を人口レベルのデータから理解しようとする研究分野のことである。
「計量-」の研究者が頻繁に使う社会調査データを思い浮かべてみよう。JGSS, SSM, NFRJ...どれも（多少の年齢の区切りは異なるが）日本に住む人を対象とした無作為抽出の調査である。これらの調査は、ランダムサンプリングによって、対象となるサンプルが日本に住む人を代表するという条件を満たしている。したがって、より具体的に言えば、「計量-」の研究者が行なっているのは、サンプルの分析結果を母集団（人口）に一般化させた上で、その「人口」と社会を同一視している。
社会学者はそういう代表性のあるデータから、因果的言明は難しいが社会を「記述」することの強みを訴える。要するに、観察データからは因果推論をすることは難しい、という主張があるが、それに対して「いや、私たちが行なっているのは因果推論ではなく、社会の記述だ」という反論を社会学者は用意している。そのロジックは、まさに筒井先生の記事で「データをみながら社会の長期的変化を考える」という形で指摘されていることである。
しかし、どうやら計量社会学者の中にも因果推論をする人もいると筒井先生は考えているらしく、どうも歯切れが悪い。人口学者の中にも、確かに因果推論をする人はいるが、彼らの関心はpopulation levelにおける政策効果などである。その限りにおいては、彼らも分析対象は「人口」であり、何も矛盾はない。私からすれば、社会学は記述で、経済学は因果推論という考え方自体はナンセンスに感じる。
「計量-」の研究者の分析対象はあくまで「社会」であって、それは「人口」に還元されるものではない、と主張することもできるだろう。しかし、それは実際の分析において「人口」に還元されない「社会」を明らかにできる限りにおいてである、と考える。「人口」に還元されない「社会」を表現する術を計量社会学者が持っているかというと、私はそう思わない。彼らが行なっている社会を記述する作業というのは、社会と定義されるところの人口を介して理解されている、というのが私の考えである。したがって、「計量-」の研究者が分析しているものは「人口」であって、明らかにしたい対象が「社会」である場合、「人口」は「社会」の操作的な定義になる。
私は別に「社会」がないと言っているわけではない。「人口」に還元されない「社会」もあるかもしれない、というか、あると考えるのが社会学だろう。私は、自分の研究で分析しているのは「人口」だが、その背景には「社会」があると考えている。社会の変化があって人口も変化する。ただ、データから社会は直接観察できないから、人口を介して観察する。
「計量-」の研究者が持っているデータや分析手法では、あくまで対象は「人口」であるというのが私の考えだが、その意識を持つことで、それまで縁遠いと思っていた分野に対してアプローチできる利点もある。アメリカでは、日本で「計量-」に分類されるような研究者の多くがアメリカ人口学会（PAA）に参加している。PAAは人口学の学会だが、ピュアの人口学者が学会に占める割合は少なく、多くが社会学者と経済学者からなる集まりである。社会学会と比べた時のPAAの特徴は、非常に経験的な分析を重視すること、とりわけ人口データ（センサスなどの官庁統計や社会調査データ）を用いた分析を重視することがあげられる。こうした特徴のため、理論的な志向性は薄い。
広く「人口」に関心がある研究者が集まるこの学会は分野横断的である。先ほど挙げた社会移動、都市化、家族、他にも多くの分野からなる研究が報告されている。当該分野では目にすることのない新しいデータ、新しい手法に出会うことも多く、発見に満ちている。自分たちが対象としているのが「人口」であると視点を変え、PAAに参加すれば、こうした新しい出会いが待っているのに、なぜ日本の計量社会学の人たちはPAAに参加しないのだろうか。これは私がこの数ヶ月解決できていない謎の一つである。
March 21, 2019
March 14, 2019
Revisiting Diverging Destinies
In recent years, both sociologists and economists have paid much attention to a divergence in family behaviors. Sociologist Sara McLanahan is the first person who proposed so called diverging destinies hypothesis at her presidential address at Population Association of America (McLanahan 2004). In this address, she argued that there has been an increase in non-traditional family behaviors (delayed marriage, cohabitation, non-marital childbearing, and divorce) in the Untied States, and this pattern accompanies a growing divide between high and low SES groups. Specifically, highly educated women, who had actually a higher probability of divorce and delayed marriage in the past, are (1) more likely to experience marrying someone, (2) less likely to have children out of wedlock, and (3) less likely to be divorced than lower educated women. McLanahan further argued that these growing divides in family behaviors across SES groups have a significant implication for children. This is what she called diverging “destinies,” meaning that single parenthood, non-marital childbearing, and divorce, all of which are now concentrated among lower educated groups, are negatively associated with children’s socio-economic outcomes.
Economists also echo her thesis. In particular, Lundberg et al. (2016) also discussed a diverging family patterns in the United States. This paper paid a particular attention to the rise in cohabitation as a main cause of the retreat from marriage over the years. To explain the rise in cohabitation, Lundberg et al. (2016) provides an economic explanation focusing on a role of marriage for investing in their children and how changes in economic incentives of investment in children explain the divergent patterns in family behaviors.
Given its potential implication and wide coverage of scope, it is not surprising that this thesis has been cited often, both positively and negatively, in demographic science. One of major critiques provided by other scholars is its limited contextual focus. Although her address and later updates (McLanahan and Jacobsen 2014) discussed cases from other countries, the thesis is mainly focused on the United States. Importantly, limited focus is not on countries but contexts. McLanahan extends her thesis to rich European countries, which also have seen the rise in cohabitation, non-marital childbearing, and divorce. Although her update (McLanahan and Jacobsen 2014) looked at a non-Western country, Japan, it only examined growing educational divide in the likelihood of divorce (Raymo et al. 2004). As I discuss below, countries with other contexts, including Japan, did not necessarily see the rise in cohabitation.
Although this hypothesis covers a wide range of non-traditional family behaviors, its generalizability seems to be limited. This makes a somewhat interesting contrast with the Second Demographic Transition, which posits that ideational changes lead to a new stage of demographic transition in rich countries broadly. In order to increase a theoretical leverage of this hypothesis, this short essay proposes that we should focus on smaller number of explananda (things to be explained). To provide this redefinition of the thesis, I first examine proposed causes and whether these causes are applicable to other contexts. Based on this examination, I then propose that a redefinition of the thesis is needed for much broader theoretical implication.
Causes of diverging patterns in family behaviors and its generalizability
McLanahan argued that there are four causes that drive the diverging patterns in family behaviors: the rise in feminism, changing birth control, changing labor market prospects for women and men, and changing welfare policy for single mothers (McLanahan 2004: 617-619). These proposed causes suggest that one fundamental pathway through which family formation have changed, that is, declining economic incentive of marriage. Women’s improved access to education and labor market and welfare programs to support single mothers decreased economic incentive for women to marry. A decline in “marriageable” men caused by a deterioration of low-skilled workers also contributes to this pattern.
Lundberg et al. (2016) adds another insight to the causes of divergence, which focuses on marriage as a commitment device. This point is based on an economic model of family formation in which individuals are expected to calculate gains from marriage. As non-traditional family behaviors such as cohabitation have been more accepted, actors may choose to marry or not based on their cost-benefit calculation. Lundberg et al. (2016) argued that since an exit cost (dissolution) is higher for marriage than for cohabitation, marriage could function as a devise which makes a commitment more feasible. A specific example of commitment they raised is children’s education. Since there has been diverging patterns in returns to education in the United States, investing in children’s education is increasingly a more compelling reason for highly educated couples to get married rather than staying unmarried.
This seems to be similar to the declining economic incentive of marriage, but this scenario is distinct from the declining incentive thesis because it argues that economic incentive to marry has actually increased especially for highly educated groups. Indeed, Lundberg et al. (2016: 90) argued that while declining economic incentive to marry is a “proximate cause of the retreat from marriage,” its underlying forces are applicable to all education groups. In addition to that, if we focus on consumption aspect as a source of marriage (Becker 1973), an increase in return to the consumption (i.e., “raising economically successful children”) among highly educated group offsets the declining demand of marriage (Lundberg et al. 2016: 93-94).
Based on McLanahan (2004) and Lundberg et al. (2016) discussions about causes of diverging patterns in family behaviors, the two mechanisms are proposed to explain why family patterns have diverged. Importantly, these proposed mechanisms are derived from mostly an examination of a single case, that is, the United States. Thus, examining whether these mechanisms are applicable to other contexts is open to empirical test and could elucidate which part of diverging destinies thesis should be observed or not in broader contexts. Given the limited space, the discussion below is focused on one single country which shares the level of economic development but different socio-cultural foundations, that is, Japan.
First, declining incentive of marriage is generally applicable to the Japanese case. Demographers generally agreed that (1) rising women’s education is positively associated with both delayed marriage and less marriage and (2) the declining economic prospects among less educated men contributes to the retreat from marriage (Raymo et al. 2015). In contrast, growing demand for marriage as a commitment devise is not necessarily applicable. If this hypothesis is right, we should expect to see other changes in family formation, that is assortative mating. Indeed, the United State has seen a dramatic increase in educational assortative mating (Schwartz and Mare 2005). However, educational homogamy has declined in Japan (Fujihara and Uchikoshi 2019).
What should be noted here is that these mechanisms could possibly explain why people do marry or not marry, but it does not explain why people increasingly stay in a cohabiting union, because if these hypotheses are correct, people may choose to stay single and do not have children. This is what has occurred in East Asian countries including Japan, where studies argued the proportion of life-long singlehood has increased markedly among both men and women (National Institute of Population and Social Security Research 2018).
To summarize, some of the mechanisms proposed to explain diverging patterns in family behaviors could be applicable to other contexts, but others not. Importantly, these mechanisms are focused on why there has been an uneven patterns in the retreat from marriage, but it fails to explain why cohabitation has increased among specific groups. If they fail to explain the rise in cohabitation, it also fails to explain the rise in non-marital childbearing, because the increase in out of wedlock childbearing largely occurs in cohabiting unions. Since cohabitation increased but its duration has been short on average, non-marital childbearing has been marginal in East Asian countries (Raymo et al. 2015).
Thus, differentials in the likelihood of marriage (not cohabitation) and divorce remain after rejecting the rise in cohabitation and non-marital childbearing. As I have argued, studies suggest that the demand for marriage as a commitment device has not increased in Japan. Possibly reflecting this trend, results on the relationship between education and marriage are mixed. Some studies reported there is a negative relationship but a couple of studies argued the relationship has changed in recent cohorts (Raymo et al 2015). Therefore, there is only one family pattern which was observed as part of diverging destinies proposed by McLanahan, that is divorce (Raymo et al. 2004). Considering these patterns, scholars in the diverging destinies need to recognize that family patterns have diverged not only within a given population but also between populations.
Possible redefinition of diverging destinies thesis
In this essay, I asked the following question, that is, in which direction the diverging destinies thesis should be heading? Given the diverging patterns in family formation between populations, it is safe to argue that the thesis focuses on smaller number of explananda. Specifically, the thesis should stick with why there is a growing divide in marriage and divorce across SES groups, while admitting other possible choices of family formation (e.g., cohabitation or nonmarital childbearing) depend on socio-cultural contexts. In other words, it is recommended not to attempt to argue that the rise in cohabitation and non-marital childbearing is the diverging family pattern we should see. Rather, scholars focusing on potential implications of the thesis try to find other relevant and similar family patterns, and examine whether there is a growing divide between high and low SES groups.
Also, they have to pay more attention to the role of social norm or ideology. Socio-cultural contexts often appear in individual’s attitudes towards social norms or ideologies, which often functions as a barrier to change rather than cause of change (Ruggles 2015). In this sense, it was somewhat unfortunate that the diverging destinies thesis did not fully discuss the role of social norm but treated changes in social norms as given (Mclanahan 2004: 617; Lundberg et al. 2016: 86). As Goode argued more than 50 years ago, changes in family patterns would be slow without the influence of ideology (Goode 1963: 369). Given the lasting influence of social norm in Asian countries that makes a linkage between fertility and marriage strong, a close examination of ideational factors helps us understand the diverging patterns in family behaviors between populations.
References
Becker, G. S. 1973. “A Theory of Marriage: Part I.” The Journal of Political Economy 81(4):813–46.
Fujihara, S. and F. Uchikoshi. 2019. “Research in Social Stratification and Mobility.” Research in Social Stratification and Mobility 1–12 (in press).
Goode, W. 1963. World Revolution and Family Patterns. The Free Press.
Lundberg, S., R. A. Pollak, and J. Stearns. 2016. "Family Inequality: Diverging Patterns in Marriage, Cohabitation, and Childbearing." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 30(2), 79-102.
McLanahan, S. 2004. “Diverging Destinies: How Children Are Faring Under the Second Demographic Transition.” Demography 41(4):607–27.
McLanahan, S. and W. Jacobsen. 2014. “Diverging Destinies Revisited.” Pp. 3–23 in Families in an Era of Increasing Inequality, edited by P. R. Amato, A. Booth, S. M. McHale, and J. Van Hook. Springer.
National Institute of Population and Social Security Research. 2018. Latest demographic statistics. Tokyo: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research.
Raymo, J. M., H. Park, Y. Xie, and W.-J. J. Yeung. 2015. “Marriage and Family in East Asia: Continuity and Change.” Annual Review of Sociology 41(1):471–92.
Raymo, J. M., L. Bumpass, and M. Iwasawa. 2004. “Marital Dissolution in Japan.” Demographic Research 11:395–420.
Ruggles, S. 2015. “Patriarchy, Power, and Pay: the Transformation of American Families, 1800–2015.” Demography 52(6):1797–1823.
Schwartz, C. R. and R. D. Mare. 2005. “Trends in Educational Assortative Marriage From 1940 to 2003.” Demography 42(4):621–46.
Economists also echo her thesis. In particular, Lundberg et al. (2016) also discussed a diverging family patterns in the United States. This paper paid a particular attention to the rise in cohabitation as a main cause of the retreat from marriage over the years. To explain the rise in cohabitation, Lundberg et al. (2016) provides an economic explanation focusing on a role of marriage for investing in their children and how changes in economic incentives of investment in children explain the divergent patterns in family behaviors.
Given its potential implication and wide coverage of scope, it is not surprising that this thesis has been cited often, both positively and negatively, in demographic science. One of major critiques provided by other scholars is its limited contextual focus. Although her address and later updates (McLanahan and Jacobsen 2014) discussed cases from other countries, the thesis is mainly focused on the United States. Importantly, limited focus is not on countries but contexts. McLanahan extends her thesis to rich European countries, which also have seen the rise in cohabitation, non-marital childbearing, and divorce. Although her update (McLanahan and Jacobsen 2014) looked at a non-Western country, Japan, it only examined growing educational divide in the likelihood of divorce (Raymo et al. 2004). As I discuss below, countries with other contexts, including Japan, did not necessarily see the rise in cohabitation.
Although this hypothesis covers a wide range of non-traditional family behaviors, its generalizability seems to be limited. This makes a somewhat interesting contrast with the Second Demographic Transition, which posits that ideational changes lead to a new stage of demographic transition in rich countries broadly. In order to increase a theoretical leverage of this hypothesis, this short essay proposes that we should focus on smaller number of explananda (things to be explained). To provide this redefinition of the thesis, I first examine proposed causes and whether these causes are applicable to other contexts. Based on this examination, I then propose that a redefinition of the thesis is needed for much broader theoretical implication.
Causes of diverging patterns in family behaviors and its generalizability
McLanahan argued that there are four causes that drive the diverging patterns in family behaviors: the rise in feminism, changing birth control, changing labor market prospects for women and men, and changing welfare policy for single mothers (McLanahan 2004: 617-619). These proposed causes suggest that one fundamental pathway through which family formation have changed, that is, declining economic incentive of marriage. Women’s improved access to education and labor market and welfare programs to support single mothers decreased economic incentive for women to marry. A decline in “marriageable” men caused by a deterioration of low-skilled workers also contributes to this pattern.
Lundberg et al. (2016) adds another insight to the causes of divergence, which focuses on marriage as a commitment device. This point is based on an economic model of family formation in which individuals are expected to calculate gains from marriage. As non-traditional family behaviors such as cohabitation have been more accepted, actors may choose to marry or not based on their cost-benefit calculation. Lundberg et al. (2016) argued that since an exit cost (dissolution) is higher for marriage than for cohabitation, marriage could function as a devise which makes a commitment more feasible. A specific example of commitment they raised is children’s education. Since there has been diverging patterns in returns to education in the United States, investing in children’s education is increasingly a more compelling reason for highly educated couples to get married rather than staying unmarried.
This seems to be similar to the declining economic incentive of marriage, but this scenario is distinct from the declining incentive thesis because it argues that economic incentive to marry has actually increased especially for highly educated groups. Indeed, Lundberg et al. (2016: 90) argued that while declining economic incentive to marry is a “proximate cause of the retreat from marriage,” its underlying forces are applicable to all education groups. In addition to that, if we focus on consumption aspect as a source of marriage (Becker 1973), an increase in return to the consumption (i.e., “raising economically successful children”) among highly educated group offsets the declining demand of marriage (Lundberg et al. 2016: 93-94).
Based on McLanahan (2004) and Lundberg et al. (2016) discussions about causes of diverging patterns in family behaviors, the two mechanisms are proposed to explain why family patterns have diverged. Importantly, these proposed mechanisms are derived from mostly an examination of a single case, that is, the United States. Thus, examining whether these mechanisms are applicable to other contexts is open to empirical test and could elucidate which part of diverging destinies thesis should be observed or not in broader contexts. Given the limited space, the discussion below is focused on one single country which shares the level of economic development but different socio-cultural foundations, that is, Japan.
First, declining incentive of marriage is generally applicable to the Japanese case. Demographers generally agreed that (1) rising women’s education is positively associated with both delayed marriage and less marriage and (2) the declining economic prospects among less educated men contributes to the retreat from marriage (Raymo et al. 2015). In contrast, growing demand for marriage as a commitment devise is not necessarily applicable. If this hypothesis is right, we should expect to see other changes in family formation, that is assortative mating. Indeed, the United State has seen a dramatic increase in educational assortative mating (Schwartz and Mare 2005). However, educational homogamy has declined in Japan (Fujihara and Uchikoshi 2019).
What should be noted here is that these mechanisms could possibly explain why people do marry or not marry, but it does not explain why people increasingly stay in a cohabiting union, because if these hypotheses are correct, people may choose to stay single and do not have children. This is what has occurred in East Asian countries including Japan, where studies argued the proportion of life-long singlehood has increased markedly among both men and women (National Institute of Population and Social Security Research 2018).
To summarize, some of the mechanisms proposed to explain diverging patterns in family behaviors could be applicable to other contexts, but others not. Importantly, these mechanisms are focused on why there has been an uneven patterns in the retreat from marriage, but it fails to explain why cohabitation has increased among specific groups. If they fail to explain the rise in cohabitation, it also fails to explain the rise in non-marital childbearing, because the increase in out of wedlock childbearing largely occurs in cohabiting unions. Since cohabitation increased but its duration has been short on average, non-marital childbearing has been marginal in East Asian countries (Raymo et al. 2015).
Thus, differentials in the likelihood of marriage (not cohabitation) and divorce remain after rejecting the rise in cohabitation and non-marital childbearing. As I have argued, studies suggest that the demand for marriage as a commitment device has not increased in Japan. Possibly reflecting this trend, results on the relationship between education and marriage are mixed. Some studies reported there is a negative relationship but a couple of studies argued the relationship has changed in recent cohorts (Raymo et al 2015). Therefore, there is only one family pattern which was observed as part of diverging destinies proposed by McLanahan, that is divorce (Raymo et al. 2004). Considering these patterns, scholars in the diverging destinies need to recognize that family patterns have diverged not only within a given population but also between populations.
Possible redefinition of diverging destinies thesis
In this essay, I asked the following question, that is, in which direction the diverging destinies thesis should be heading? Given the diverging patterns in family formation between populations, it is safe to argue that the thesis focuses on smaller number of explananda. Specifically, the thesis should stick with why there is a growing divide in marriage and divorce across SES groups, while admitting other possible choices of family formation (e.g., cohabitation or nonmarital childbearing) depend on socio-cultural contexts. In other words, it is recommended not to attempt to argue that the rise in cohabitation and non-marital childbearing is the diverging family pattern we should see. Rather, scholars focusing on potential implications of the thesis try to find other relevant and similar family patterns, and examine whether there is a growing divide between high and low SES groups.
Also, they have to pay more attention to the role of social norm or ideology. Socio-cultural contexts often appear in individual’s attitudes towards social norms or ideologies, which often functions as a barrier to change rather than cause of change (Ruggles 2015). In this sense, it was somewhat unfortunate that the diverging destinies thesis did not fully discuss the role of social norm but treated changes in social norms as given (Mclanahan 2004: 617; Lundberg et al. 2016: 86). As Goode argued more than 50 years ago, changes in family patterns would be slow without the influence of ideology (Goode 1963: 369). Given the lasting influence of social norm in Asian countries that makes a linkage between fertility and marriage strong, a close examination of ideational factors helps us understand the diverging patterns in family behaviors between populations.
References
Becker, G. S. 1973. “A Theory of Marriage: Part I.” The Journal of Political Economy 81(4):813–46.
Fujihara, S. and F. Uchikoshi. 2019. “Research in Social Stratification and Mobility.” Research in Social Stratification and Mobility 1–12 (in press).
Goode, W. 1963. World Revolution and Family Patterns. The Free Press.
Lundberg, S., R. A. Pollak, and J. Stearns. 2016. "Family Inequality: Diverging Patterns in Marriage, Cohabitation, and Childbearing." Journal of Economic Perspectives, 30(2), 79-102.
McLanahan, S. 2004. “Diverging Destinies: How Children Are Faring Under the Second Demographic Transition.” Demography 41(4):607–27.
McLanahan, S. and W. Jacobsen. 2014. “Diverging Destinies Revisited.” Pp. 3–23 in Families in an Era of Increasing Inequality, edited by P. R. Amato, A. Booth, S. M. McHale, and J. Van Hook. Springer.
National Institute of Population and Social Security Research. 2018. Latest demographic statistics. Tokyo: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research.
Raymo, J. M., H. Park, Y. Xie, and W.-J. J. Yeung. 2015. “Marriage and Family in East Asia: Continuity and Change.” Annual Review of Sociology 41(1):471–92.
Raymo, J. M., L. Bumpass, and M. Iwasawa. 2004. “Marital Dissolution in Japan.” Demographic Research 11:395–420.
Ruggles, S. 2015. “Patriarchy, Power, and Pay: the Transformation of American Families, 1800–2015.” Demography 52(6):1797–1823.
Schwartz, C. R. and R. D. Mare. 2005. “Trends in Educational Assortative Marriage From 1940 to 2003.” Demography 42(4):621–46.
March 13, 2019
Thoughts on elite education
I am thankful to my alma mater, the University of Tokyo, for educating me for 8 years. I recall that I wanted to study at national universities because its tuition was lower than private ones. When we apply to national universities, we have only 2 chances to take an entrance exam for each school. Choosing UTokyo exam was challenging in my first admission. I failed, so I spent one year at a prep school. Second try was successful. I could take an exam for other schools which are much easier to get into, but I wanted to have better education.
I was surprised many times during the first month after enrollment. I often found that my friends were from wealthy or intellectual backgrounds. It was my first time to meet with a person whose parent's occupation is university professor. Since then, I’ve been interested in the role of family background in creation of inequality.
UTokyo is obviously the top elite school in Japan. It was established in 1877 to create national elites. Now its admission is open to everyone, although opportunities to take and pass the exam are not equally distributed across different socioeconomic strata. As a first-generation college student from working-class background, I was able to experience upward social mobility via education at UTokyo. I was fortunate that I studied at UTokyo in my undergraduate and graduate. In this sense, I believe in the value of meritocracy. Regardless of its origin, opportunities for better education should be open to everyone.
I was surprised many times during the first month after enrollment. I often found that my friends were from wealthy or intellectual backgrounds. It was my first time to meet with a person whose parent's occupation is university professor. Since then, I’ve been interested in the role of family background in creation of inequality.
UTokyo is obviously the top elite school in Japan. It was established in 1877 to create national elites. Now its admission is open to everyone, although opportunities to take and pass the exam are not equally distributed across different socioeconomic strata. As a first-generation college student from working-class background, I was able to experience upward social mobility via education at UTokyo. I was fortunate that I studied at UTokyo in my undergraduate and graduate. In this sense, I believe in the value of meritocracy. Regardless of its origin, opportunities for better education should be open to everyone.
March 9, 2019
Visit day
今日は博士課程に合格した人たちがくるvisit dayと呼ばれるイベントだった。
私は、昨年の今頃初めてマディソンの地に着いて、社会学部やCDEの人たちから話を伺ったのだが、早いものでもう一年が経ってしまった。この一年で、マディソンにもたくさん友人ができたが、社会学部のコミュニティの中で日々生きていることに改めて感謝したいと思わせてくれる1日だった。
今回、スペースがないので合格者をホストできなかったので、その代わりに土曜のハウジングツアーのオーガナイズと、今日あった大学院生とのパネルでの登壇者を務めた。
朝に共著のミーティングがあったので、10時ごろに出発して11時半から始まったsolodarity（マイノリティ学生の学部内の組織）のオープンハウスに参加。12時45分から学部のランチ（いつものようにジミージョーンズのサンドウィッチ）。そのあとすぐにCDEのオープンハウス（多少のフルーツ）。3時半から院生パネル。昨年は自分があの場に座っていて質問したと思うと、時が経つのは随分早いことを思い知らされる。その流れで学部主催のディナー、最後に学生たちだけのハッピーアワーで飲み会。長い1日だった。
改めて、私はウィスコンシン・ソシオロジーの中で生きていることに、本当に感謝している。ファカルティ、院生の友達ともみんなよくしてくれるし、日々のコースワークは辛いけど、たまにあるこういうイベントで、うちの学部の紐帯の強さを再確認する。多様な価値観に恵まれて、日々研究できていることが、本当に幸せだと思った。visit dayはマディソンで研究生活を始めてから自分が歩んできた軌跡を振り返させてくれる意味で、非常に貴重な機会であり、今後も積極的に関わっていきたいと思う。
私は、昨年の今頃初めてマディソンの地に着いて、社会学部やCDEの人たちから話を伺ったのだが、早いものでもう一年が経ってしまった。この一年で、マディソンにもたくさん友人ができたが、社会学部のコミュニティの中で日々生きていることに改めて感謝したいと思わせてくれる1日だった。
今回、スペースがないので合格者をホストできなかったので、その代わりに土曜のハウジングツアーのオーガナイズと、今日あった大学院生とのパネルでの登壇者を務めた。
朝に共著のミーティングがあったので、10時ごろに出発して11時半から始まったsolodarity（マイノリティ学生の学部内の組織）のオープンハウスに参加。12時45分から学部のランチ（いつものようにジミージョーンズのサンドウィッチ）。そのあとすぐにCDEのオープンハウス（多少のフルーツ）。3時半から院生パネル。昨年は自分があの場に座っていて質問したと思うと、時が経つのは随分早いことを思い知らされる。その流れで学部主催のディナー、最後に学生たちだけのハッピーアワーで飲み会。長い1日だった。
改めて、私はウィスコンシン・ソシオロジーの中で生きていることに、本当に感謝している。ファカルティ、院生の友達ともみんなよくしてくれるし、日々のコースワークは辛いけど、たまにあるこういうイベントで、うちの学部の紐帯の強さを再確認する。多様な価値観に恵まれて、日々研究できていることが、本当に幸せだと思った。visit dayはマディソンで研究生活を始めてから自分が歩んできた軌跡を振り返させてくれる意味で、非常に貴重な機会であり、今後も積極的に関わっていきたいと思う。
March 5, 2019
3月
とにかく忙しい。4日は朝9時半から大学院セミナー、ジョブトーク、演者とのランチ、統計の授業であっという間に6時になり、そこから水曜の政治学の授業のエッセイを書いてたので12時間ほど働いてた。土日は家で作業したので疲れはそこまでない。帰って家で明日の人口学の文献と課題を済ませて、メール業務。
木曜に統計の中間テスト、その後から土曜まで博士課程に受かった人のビジットデイになるので今週も忙しい。私の役回りは院生パネルへの登壇とハウジングツアーのオーガナイズ。そのメールも回さないといけない。料理をする精神的な余裕はないので、ひたすらキムチスープラーメンと焼豚を食べる。
木曜に統計の中間テスト、その後から土曜まで博士課程に受かった人のビジットデイになるので今週も忙しい。私の役回りは院生パネルへの登壇とハウジングツアーのオーガナイズ。そのメールも回さないといけない。料理をする精神的な余裕はないので、ひたすらキムチスープラーメンと焼豚を食べる。